I saw on the news that Kris is considering as ground for annulment of her marriage with James the fact that neither she nor James is a member of the sect or religious group of the priest or minister who solemnized their marriage. Obviously, she is relying on Articles 3, 4, 7, and 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Article 3 of said Code enumerates the formal requisites for the validity of marriage. First in the list is "1. Authority of the solemnizing officer.". Furthermore, Article 4 provides that absence of any of these essential requisites shall render the marriage void from the beginning. Consequently, the conclusion would seem to be such that the absence of the "authority of the solemnizing officer" shall render the marriage celebrated by that officer void from the beginning.
You may ask "how did the priest or minister who solemnized their marriage become in want of authority?". The answer is in Article 7 of the Family Code which enumerates the persons who are authorized to solemnize marriages, and which, in paragraph 2 thereof reads "2. Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by the church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar...and PROVIDED that AT LEAST ONE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BELONGS TO THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER'S CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS SECT". Thus, when not any one of them (Kris and James) being member of the church or religious sect of which the "solemnizer" of their marriage is a minister, their marriage, it would seem, could be declared void from the beginning for lacking one of the formal requisites.
Their contention seems to find additional support in Article 35 of the Family Code which enumerates marriages that are void from the beginning. Number 2 in said list provides "2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages...". Now, this first part of said provision, seems to bolster Kris' contention of nullity of her marriage with James since apparently, maybe in their view, the solemnizing officer indeed lacked authority to solemnize their marriage. A reading, however, of the rest of the provision reveals that the marriage cannot be declared void from the beginning if the marriage was contracted "with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the authority to do so". This means that even if just one of them (Kris or James) believed (i will no longer add "in good faith" because i believe that believing something or in something presupposes that there is good faith, otherwise, there is really no belief at all) at the time of their marriage that the solemnizing officer had the authority, then their marriage cannot be considered void from the beginning.
If both of them believed at the time of their marriage that the solemnizing officer had the authority, then well and good, both of them are in good faith. Now, if only Kris believed, then James was in bad faith at the time of their marriage. Conversely, if only James believed, then Kris was in bad faith. Worse, if both of them knew at that time of the celebration of their marriage that the solemnizing officer had no authority to perform said marriage, then both of them are in bad faith. If the latter is true, then they got married knowing that said marriage will eventually be annulled - that could be the worst form of mockery of a sacred institution. If James was in bad faith, then as to Kris who was in good faith, the validity of marriage should be upheld, that is should he desire to defend it (but which is not the case since she is the one seeking an annulment). On the other hand, if Kris was in bad faith, then James can very well oppose the annulment citing the ground of belief in good faith in the authority of the solemnizing officer.
James can also rely on the third paragraph of Article 4 of the Family Code which reads "An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or the parties responsible for such irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable". He can do it because the minister or priest who solemnized their marriage was not really totally devoid of any authority to perform said marriage. Presumably, he was authorized by his religious sect to do so, and was properly registered with the civil registrar general. To my mind, there was a mere irregularity in the authority of said minister, which irregularity may have been caused by the minister himself, who is presumed to have known who are and who are not members of his sect. The party in bad faith may also be one of the causes of such irregularity. Consequently, either party, who was in bad faith, or both of them, could be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. It's either Kris, James, or both. Your pick. :)
Monday, August 16, 2010
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Agrarian Reform Law or No Agrarian Reform Law?
Finally we had our final examination in Agrarian Reform Law last night. It means one less subject to worry about, but could also be a reminder that there are yet seven more subjects to go. I coursed on smoothly through seven questions. Smoothly, of course, should not be construed to mean that the questions were easy because they were not - at least not for me who came utterly unprepared. I am not sure that I can get the maximum point alloted for each question, though I am certain I was not able to complete at least two of those blasted enumerations. As to the final item, it was both interesting and relieving. Interesting because we were hypothetically considered as Dean of the College of Law and relieving because it was a bonus question. The question had us acting as the Dean of the College of Law confronted with a question on whether or not to continue offering Agrarian Reform Law despite it's non-Bar status. I was not hungry, because we were treated to free Jollibee Value Meal No. 1 by our generous professor, so I performed a little internal deliberation to come up with a simple and straightforward answer that goes this way:
There you have it, my humble attempt to compensate for those forgotten items in the enumeration, I hope I make it. :)
"The quest to become a lawyer does not end with passing the Bar Exams. On the contrary, it is merely the beginning. Once already a lawyer, one is confronted with several issues requiring substantial knowledge of law specific to each. Agrarian issues is real and is here to stay. It is as real as the hundreds of thousands of acres of agricultural land cultivated by an equal if not greater number of farmers and farm workers. Both land and people are relevant to our lives. Whether or not it is a Bar subject does not affect the relevance of Agrarian Reform Law. Thus, it is wise to continue offering it."
There you have it, my humble attempt to compensate for those forgotten items in the enumeration, I hope I make it. :)
Monday, September 22, 2008
Land Bank of the Philippines vs Severino Listana, Sr.
A summary of a decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
Although this appears to be an agrarian reform related case but it is actually one that rules on the power, or lack of it, of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to issue contempt orders and consequently order the arrest of persons cited for contempt, as provided for in R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
Here is the case:
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003
Facts of the case:
Private respondent Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of 246.0561 ha. in Sorsogon to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but Listana refused to sell at that price, so the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in an administrative proceeding determined the just compensation of the land at P10,956,963.25 and ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A writ of execution was issued by PARAD to that effect but it was apparently not complied with by LBP so a Motion for Contempt was filed by Listana with the PARAD against petitioner LBP. PARAD granted the Motion for Contempt and cited for indirect contempt and ordered the arrest of ALEX A. LORAYES, the Manager of LBP. LBP obtained a preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon enjoining DARAB from enforcing the arrest order against Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC. Consequently, petitioner LBP filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the order for the arrest of petitioner's manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid.
Ruling:
The arrest order issued by PARAD against Lorayes was not valid because the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were themselves invalid. Said proceedings were invalid for the following reasons:
First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent.
Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent?s "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
Angel Locsin (res ipsa loquitor)
Although this appears to be an agrarian reform related case but it is actually one that rules on the power, or lack of it, of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to issue contempt orders and consequently order the arrest of persons cited for contempt, as provided for in R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
Here is the case:
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003
Facts of the case:
Private respondent Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of 246.0561 ha. in Sorsogon to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but Listana refused to sell at that price, so the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in an administrative proceeding determined the just compensation of the land at P10,956,963.25 and ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A writ of execution was issued by PARAD to that effect but it was apparently not complied with by LBP so a Motion for Contempt was filed by Listana with the PARAD against petitioner LBP. PARAD granted the Motion for Contempt and cited for indirect contempt and ordered the arrest of ALEX A. LORAYES, the Manager of LBP. LBP obtained a preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon enjoining DARAB from enforcing the arrest order against Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC. Consequently, petitioner LBP filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the order for the arrest of petitioner's manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid.
Ruling:
The arrest order issued by PARAD against Lorayes was not valid because the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were themselves invalid. Said proceedings were invalid for the following reasons:
First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent.
Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent?s "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
Angel Locsin (res ipsa loquitor)
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
People of the Philippines vs Manungas
A Summary of a Decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y GO @ "PERCY", accused-appellant.
Facts of the case:
In 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In connection with this, Fernando required the applicants the several amounts for medical, placement and other fees. The applicants failed to be deployed to Saudi however, and upon verification with POEA, they found out that Fernando was not a licensed recruiter. Complainants filed complaints of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale against Fernando. Fernando maintained that he was not illegally recruiting because he was connected with a duly licensed recruitment agency, and that only because the job openings was subsequently awarded to another recruitment agency that the applicants he recruited were not able to leave for Saudi.
Issue:
Whether or not Fernando was guilty of Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale, given the circumstances.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Fernando, despite of his being connected with a licensed recruitment agency, was still guilty of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, because he performed the acts of recruitment as defined in Article 13 of the Labor Code, by himself. He was the one who recruited the applicants, and he was the one who required of them the fees he collected himself. Illegal recruitment was also qualified because he recruited more than three persons.
Kristine Hermosa
G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y GO @ "PERCY", accused-appellant.
Facts of the case:
In 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In connection with this, Fernando required the applicants the several amounts for medical, placement and other fees. The applicants failed to be deployed to Saudi however, and upon verification with POEA, they found out that Fernando was not a licensed recruiter. Complainants filed complaints of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale against Fernando. Fernando maintained that he was not illegally recruiting because he was connected with a duly licensed recruitment agency, and that only because the job openings was subsequently awarded to another recruitment agency that the applicants he recruited were not able to leave for Saudi.
Issue:
Whether or not Fernando was guilty of Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale, given the circumstances.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Fernando, despite of his being connected with a licensed recruitment agency, was still guilty of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, because he performed the acts of recruitment as defined in Article 13 of the Labor Code, by himself. He was the one who recruited the applicants, and he was the one who required of them the fees he collected himself. Illegal recruitment was also qualified because he recruited more than three persons.
Kristine Hermosa
Development Bank of the Philippines vs Secretary of Labor and Employment
A Summary of a Decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
G.R. No. 79351 November 28, 1989
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, CRESENCIA DIFONTORUM, ET AL., respondents.
Facts of the case:
Private respondents won a case for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, illegal deductions from salaries and violation of the minimum wage law against Riverside Mills Corporation. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued, on October 22, 1985 , against the goods and chattel of RMC. Said assets however had already been foreclosed by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) through an extra-judicial proceedings as early as 1983. Private respondents, in a motion, moved for the delivery of RMC properties in possession of DBP, relying on the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code giving them first preference over the mortgaged properties of RMC for the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in their favor. Which motion was granted. On appeal, the decision was affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 110 of the Labor Code finds application on the instant case. Article 110 provides that in case of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers enjoy first preference as regards wages due them for services rendered during the period prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 110 cannot be applied in the instant case because the important requisite that employer's business must be bankrupt is lacking. The Supreme Court ruled that in the Philippine jurisdiction, bankruptcy, insolvency and general judicial liquidation proceedings are the only means to establish that a business is bankrupt or insolvent. Absent of such judicial declaration, the business cannot be considered bankrupt for the purpose of applying the provisions of Article 110.
G.R. No. 79351 November 28, 1989
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, CRESENCIA DIFONTORUM, ET AL., respondents.
Facts of the case:
Private respondents won a case for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, illegal deductions from salaries and violation of the minimum wage law against Riverside Mills Corporation. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued, on October 22, 1985 , against the goods and chattel of RMC. Said assets however had already been foreclosed by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) through an extra-judicial proceedings as early as 1983. Private respondents, in a motion, moved for the delivery of RMC properties in possession of DBP, relying on the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code giving them first preference over the mortgaged properties of RMC for the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in their favor. Which motion was granted. On appeal, the decision was affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 110 of the Labor Code finds application on the instant case. Article 110 provides that in case of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers enjoy first preference as regards wages due them for services rendered during the period prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 110 cannot be applied in the instant case because the important requisite that employer's business must be bankrupt is lacking. The Supreme Court ruled that in the Philippine jurisdiction, bankruptcy, insolvency and general judicial liquidation proceedings are the only means to establish that a business is bankrupt or insolvent. Absent of such judicial declaration, the business cannot be considered bankrupt for the purpose of applying the provisions of Article 110.
Rosewood Processing, Inc. vs National Labor Relations Commission
A Summary of a Decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
G.R. Nos. 116476-84 May 21, 1998
ROSEWOOD PROCESSING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NAPOLEON C. MAMON, ARSENIO GAZZINGAN, ROMEO C. VELASCO, ARMANDO L. BALLON, VICTOR E. ALDEZA, JOSE L. CABRERA, VETERANS PHILIPPINE SCOUT SECURITY AGENCY, and/or ENGR. SERGIO JAMILA IV, respondents.
Facts of the case:
Private respondents were security guards of Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency. Some were assigned to other companies and detailed to Rosewood, while others are re-assigned to other companies from Rosewood, and still others were put on “floating” status without assignment. Most were underpaid or their wages were never paid. All these circumstances led to the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and for nonpayment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, thirteenth month pay, cash bond deposit, unpaid wages and damages was filed against Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency and/or Sergio Jamila IV (collectively referred to as the "security agency," for brevity). Thereafter, petitioner Rosewood Processing, Inc. was impleaded as a third-party respondent by the security agency. In due course, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora rendered a consolidated Decision dated March 26, 1993 finding the security agency and Rosewood as solidarily liable to pay the monetary benefits due the security guards.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Rosewood was solidarily liable with the security agency for the non-payment of wages, as provided in Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that while it is undisputable that by operation of the provisions of Articles 106, 107 and 109, the Employer which is Rosewood has solidary liability for payment of wage differentials, such liability however should only be to the extent of the period when the respondent guards were under its employment. For the periods where said guards were assigned somewhere else, the Supreme Court held that Rosewood cannot be liable. The Supreme Court further held that since there was no evidence presented pointing to the fact that Rosewood conspired with the security agency in illegally dismissing the guards, it cannot be made liable to pay back wages as provided in Article 109. Finally, since an order to pay back wages and separation pay is invested with a punitive character, such that an indirect employer should not be made liable without a finding that it had committed or conspired in the illegal dismissal, then Rosewood, which was no longer the employer of the guards when they were dismissed, should not be compelled to pay since it was clear that it took no part in the illegal dismissal.
G.R. Nos. 116476-84 May 21, 1998
ROSEWOOD PROCESSING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NAPOLEON C. MAMON, ARSENIO GAZZINGAN, ROMEO C. VELASCO, ARMANDO L. BALLON, VICTOR E. ALDEZA, JOSE L. CABRERA, VETERANS PHILIPPINE SCOUT SECURITY AGENCY, and/or ENGR. SERGIO JAMILA IV, respondents.
Facts of the case:
Private respondents were security guards of Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency. Some were assigned to other companies and detailed to Rosewood, while others are re-assigned to other companies from Rosewood, and still others were put on “floating” status without assignment. Most were underpaid or their wages were never paid. All these circumstances led to the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and for nonpayment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, thirteenth month pay, cash bond deposit, unpaid wages and damages was filed against Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency and/or Sergio Jamila IV (collectively referred to as the "security agency," for brevity). Thereafter, petitioner Rosewood Processing, Inc. was impleaded as a third-party respondent by the security agency. In due course, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora rendered a consolidated Decision dated March 26, 1993 finding the security agency and Rosewood as solidarily liable to pay the monetary benefits due the security guards.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Rosewood was solidarily liable with the security agency for the non-payment of wages, as provided in Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that while it is undisputable that by operation of the provisions of Articles 106, 107 and 109, the Employer which is Rosewood has solidary liability for payment of wage differentials, such liability however should only be to the extent of the period when the respondent guards were under its employment. For the periods where said guards were assigned somewhere else, the Supreme Court held that Rosewood cannot be liable. The Supreme Court further held that since there was no evidence presented pointing to the fact that Rosewood conspired with the security agency in illegally dismissing the guards, it cannot be made liable to pay back wages as provided in Article 109. Finally, since an order to pay back wages and separation pay is invested with a punitive character, such that an indirect employer should not be made liable without a finding that it had committed or conspired in the illegal dismissal, then Rosewood, which was no longer the employer of the guards when they were dismissed, should not be compelled to pay since it was clear that it took no part in the illegal dismissal.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Shoppers Gain Supermart vs NLRC
A Summary of a Philippine Supreme Court Decision
G.R. No. 110731 July 26, 1996
SHOPPERS GAIN SUPERMART, JERRY TAN, JACK TAN and HEIRS OF JAMES TAN, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SHOPPERS GAIN SUPERMART EMPLOYEES UNION-UMP and EDUARDO TARROSA, WARLITO AQUAIADAN, ARREO JOSE, MAGDALENA ARZAGA, JEROGE BANAGA, CORA BOLOTAOLO, ELMAR DOLUNTAR, FRANCISCO CABULADA, EVELYN CENA, ROQUITO CENA, JUANITO DAYMON, PABLITO ESMAS, ARTEMIO GERE, ROSALINDA GO, ROLITO HANDIG, ALBERTO HOLANDA, AIDA JAVIER, AVELINO JAVIER, JR., JESUS LEGASPI, MARIETA LEGASPI, PEDRO LOPEZ, ELARIO LOS BANES, GEORGE MANAL, EMMA MATIRA, RAFAEL MENODIADO, LUCILA MONARES, MYRNA ORTIZ, TERESITA PANGAHIN, ALFREDO PERLAS, JR., PACITA MANALO, ORLANDO SAN JOSE, TERESITA SANTOS, TERESITA SENGSENG, and NARCITO TUAZON; respondents.
Facts of the case:
From 1982 to 1990, private respondents had worked in the Shoppers Gain Supermarket in various capacities as "merchandiser, cashier, bagger, check-out personnel, sales lady, printer/film and warehouseman" for at least one year each. Private respondents were part of a pool of workers supplied by three (3) manpower service companies under "labor-only" contracts. In December of 1990, due to an unavoidable circumstance, petitioner constrained to stop its business and consequently terminate its contract with the three (3) manpower service companies. Petitioner was able to pay separation pays for its regular employees but not for private respondents.
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed for which the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding Shoppers Gain Supermarket guilty of labor-only contracting and ordered it to pay separation pay and backwages to respondents. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed said decision. Elevating the case to the Supreme Court, petitioners raised the following grounds inter alia:
(a) That for employer-employee to exist, the following requirements must be satisfied, namely: (1) selection and engagement of the employees; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control employees' conduct; and
(b) Since the manpower agencies themselves admitted per their respective position papers that they selected, hired, paid, disciplined, dismissed and controlled the private respondents, it followed that the latter are not the employees of the petitioner corporation but of the agencies only.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are considered employees of petitioner Shoppers Gain Supermarket in view of the fact that they were merely furnished through labor-only contracts with three manpower agencies.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that what was controlling in the issue is the provisions of Artcile 106 of the Labor Code and not that of Article 208. The former clearly defines what constitute labor-only contractor as differentiated from a direct contractor, including the legal effects of each, while the latter is merely for the purpose of determining whether or not an employee is considered regular. Based on the provision of Article 106, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was indeed the direct employer of private respondents and was therefore 0bliged to pay them separation pay. The Supreme Court reasoned that since it is undeniable that the private respondents' work as merchandisers, cashiers, baggers, check-out personnel, sales ladies, warehousemen and so forth were directly related, necessary and vital to the day-to-day operations of the supermarket and that their jobs involved normal and regular functions in the ordinary business of the petitioner corporation, the provision of Article 106 clearly applied thus making the manpower agencies merely agents of petitioner corporation. Consequently, private respondents are considered employees of petitioner Shoppers Gain Supermart.
G.R. No. 110731 July 26, 1996
SHOPPERS GAIN SUPERMART, JERRY TAN, JACK TAN and HEIRS OF JAMES TAN, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SHOPPERS GAIN SUPERMART EMPLOYEES UNION-UMP and EDUARDO TARROSA, WARLITO AQUAIADAN, ARREO JOSE, MAGDALENA ARZAGA, JEROGE BANAGA, CORA BOLOTAOLO, ELMAR DOLUNTAR, FRANCISCO CABULADA, EVELYN CENA, ROQUITO CENA, JUANITO DAYMON, PABLITO ESMAS, ARTEMIO GERE, ROSALINDA GO, ROLITO HANDIG, ALBERTO HOLANDA, AIDA JAVIER, AVELINO JAVIER, JR., JESUS LEGASPI, MARIETA LEGASPI, PEDRO LOPEZ, ELARIO LOS BANES, GEORGE MANAL, EMMA MATIRA, RAFAEL MENODIADO, LUCILA MONARES, MYRNA ORTIZ, TERESITA PANGAHIN, ALFREDO PERLAS, JR., PACITA MANALO, ORLANDO SAN JOSE, TERESITA SANTOS, TERESITA SENGSENG, and NARCITO TUAZON; respondents.
Facts of the case:
From 1982 to 1990, private respondents had worked in the Shoppers Gain Supermarket in various capacities as "merchandiser, cashier, bagger, check-out personnel, sales lady, printer/film and warehouseman" for at least one year each. Private respondents were part of a pool of workers supplied by three (3) manpower service companies under "labor-only" contracts. In December of 1990, due to an unavoidable circumstance, petitioner constrained to stop its business and consequently terminate its contract with the three (3) manpower service companies. Petitioner was able to pay separation pays for its regular employees but not for private respondents.
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed for which the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding Shoppers Gain Supermarket guilty of labor-only contracting and ordered it to pay separation pay and backwages to respondents. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed said decision. Elevating the case to the Supreme Court, petitioners raised the following grounds inter alia:
(a) That for employer-employee to exist, the following requirements must be satisfied, namely: (1) selection and engagement of the employees; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control employees' conduct; and
(b) Since the manpower agencies themselves admitted per their respective position papers that they selected, hired, paid, disciplined, dismissed and controlled the private respondents, it followed that the latter are not the employees of the petitioner corporation but of the agencies only.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are considered employees of petitioner Shoppers Gain Supermarket in view of the fact that they were merely furnished through labor-only contracts with three manpower agencies.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that what was controlling in the issue is the provisions of Artcile 106 of the Labor Code and not that of Article 208. The former clearly defines what constitute labor-only contractor as differentiated from a direct contractor, including the legal effects of each, while the latter is merely for the purpose of determining whether or not an employee is considered regular. Based on the provision of Article 106, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was indeed the direct employer of private respondents and was therefore 0bliged to pay them separation pay. The Supreme Court reasoned that since it is undeniable that the private respondents' work as merchandisers, cashiers, baggers, check-out personnel, sales ladies, warehousemen and so forth were directly related, necessary and vital to the day-to-day operations of the supermarket and that their jobs involved normal and regular functions in the ordinary business of the petitioner corporation, the provision of Article 106 clearly applied thus making the manpower agencies merely agents of petitioner corporation. Consequently, private respondents are considered employees of petitioner Shoppers Gain Supermart.
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